英語短文：私營軍事公司的興起 5
Test case in Africa
[20] This week, MPRI expects to get government approval to go into Equatorial Guinea, an agreement that illustrates the questions some critics have with a so-called privatization of foreign policy.
[21] The contract was initially rejected by two State Department desks, holding it up for two years, Soyster says. It was approved only after MPRI lobbied the department's Africa desk, arguing that if it was not allowed to do the job, someone else would.
[22] Equatorial Guinea, most of which is an island off western Africa, will pay for the contract. It wants to develop a coast guard to protect its vast oil resources, which are being tapped by Mobil Oil, Soyster says.
[23] In doing so, the government could secure probably strengthen its grip on power.
[24] Yet the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema is a rampant violator of human rights, accused of political killings, election fraud, and questionable monetary practices, according to the 1999 State Department world report on Human Rights.
[25] Equatorial Guinea's closest allies seem to be North Korea and Cuba, and it was once the brunt of State Department jokes as the worst overseas post. In 1993, US ambassador John Bennett received a death threat for trying to save local political prisoners.
[26] "The question is, 'Do you want to train a military in modern techniques so it can preserve itself?'" says Arvind Ganesan, who follows the issue for Human Rights Watch.
[27] David Isenberg, an arms-control analyst at DynMeridian, a consulting firm, says PMCs are often used in these borderline situations, when working through official channels is either too cumbersome or politically difficult . "The administration likes it because it avoids the prospect of creating a furor if ( something goes wrong)," he says.
[28] But, he explains, the US needs to do a better job of regulating PMCs, which by and large are willing to follow clearly laid rules.
[29] "If the government wants to get the most out of them, they need to regulate them," he says. "That would quiet.. .fear that they could become rogues or soldiers of fortune."
非洲的試驗案例
[20)軍事專業(yè)資源股份有限公司期待本周得到政府的批準前往赤道幾內(nèi)亞，這項雙方達成的協(xié)議恰好說明了某些批評家指出的所謂對外政策私營化的問題。
[21]索伊斯特說，國務院的兩個司最初都拒絕這項合同，使事情拖了兩年。公司向國務院非洲司做了疏通工作，講明即使不允許他們公司去做這項工作，也會有別人去做--只是在此之后，國務院才批準。
[22]赤道幾內(nèi)亞的大部分領土是非洲西部海岸外的一座島嶼，上述合同所需經(jīng)費將由該國支付。索伊斯特說，赤道幾內(nèi)亞希望建立一支海岸衛(wèi)隊來保護本國龐大的石油資源，這些資源正由美孚石油公司進行開發(fā)。
[23]政府這樣做可能可以保持住甚至強化其政權。
[24]然而，據(jù)國務院1999年世界人權報告介紹，特奧多羅·奧比昂·恩圭馬總統(tǒng)的政府是一個瘋狂踐踏人權的政府，他被指責進行政治屠殺、在選舉中舞弊，而且在金融幣制方面也有問題。
[25]赤道幾內(nèi)亞最親密的盟國好像是朝鮮和古巴，國務院有些人開玩笑時曾首當其沖地戲稱該國為最差的海外崗位。1993年，美國大使約翰·貝內(nèi)特因盡力解救當?shù)氐恼畏付盏搅怂劳鐾{。
[26]阿爾溫德·加內(nèi)桑為《人權觀察》工作，一直跟蹤研究這個問題。他說："問題是，'你希望用現(xiàn)代技術訓練出一支可以自我保存下來的軍隊嗎?'"
[27]戴維·伊森伯格是DynMeridian咨詢公司的軍備控制分析家。他說，當遇到官方渠道做工作受到阻礙或政治上有困難等不確定情況時，就常常使用私營軍事公司。"政府喜歡這樣，因為如果(發(fā)生什么問題)，這可以避免引起抗議浪潮。"
[28]但是，他解釋說，美國需要更好地對私營軍事公司進行規(guī)范管理，總的來說，這些公司愿意遵循明確制定的規(guī)章。
[29]“如果政府想充分利用他們，就需要對他們進行規(guī)范管理，”他說。“那會平息……害怕他們會成為惡棍流氓或兵痞的恐懼心理。”
Test case in Africa
[20] This week, MPRI expects to get government approval to go into Equatorial Guinea, an agreement that illustrates the questions some critics have with a so-called privatization of foreign policy.
[21] The contract was initially rejected by two State Department desks, holding it up for two years, Soyster says. It was approved only after MPRI lobbied the department's Africa desk, arguing that if it was not allowed to do the job, someone else would.
[22] Equatorial Guinea, most of which is an island off western Africa, will pay for the contract. It wants to develop a coast guard to protect its vast oil resources, which are being tapped by Mobil Oil, Soyster says.
[23] In doing so, the government could secure probably strengthen its grip on power.
[24] Yet the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema is a rampant violator of human rights, accused of political killings, election fraud, and questionable monetary practices, according to the 1999 State Department world report on Human Rights.
[25] Equatorial Guinea's closest allies seem to be North Korea and Cuba, and it was once the brunt of State Department jokes as the worst overseas post. In 1993, US ambassador John Bennett received a death threat for trying to save local political prisoners.
[26] "The question is, 'Do you want to train a military in modern techniques so it can preserve itself?'" says Arvind Ganesan, who follows the issue for Human Rights Watch.
[27] David Isenberg, an arms-control analyst at DynMeridian, a consulting firm, says PMCs are often used in these borderline situations, when working through official channels is either too cumbersome or politically difficult . "The administration likes it because it avoids the prospect of creating a furor if ( something goes wrong)," he says.
[28] But, he explains, the US needs to do a better job of regulating PMCs, which by and large are willing to follow clearly laid rules.
[29] "If the government wants to get the most out of them, they need to regulate them," he says. "That would quiet.. .fear that they could become rogues or soldiers of fortune."
非洲的試驗案例
[20)軍事專業(yè)資源股份有限公司期待本周得到政府的批準前往赤道幾內(nèi)亞，這項雙方達成的協(xié)議恰好說明了某些批評家指出的所謂對外政策私營化的問題。
[21]索伊斯特說，國務院的兩個司最初都拒絕這項合同，使事情拖了兩年。公司向國務院非洲司做了疏通工作，講明即使不允許他們公司去做這項工作，也會有別人去做--只是在此之后，國務院才批準。
[22]赤道幾內(nèi)亞的大部分領土是非洲西部海岸外的一座島嶼，上述合同所需經(jīng)費將由該國支付。索伊斯特說，赤道幾內(nèi)亞希望建立一支海岸衛(wèi)隊來保護本國龐大的石油資源，這些資源正由美孚石油公司進行開發(fā)。
[23]政府這樣做可能可以保持住甚至強化其政權。
[24]然而，據(jù)國務院1999年世界人權報告介紹，特奧多羅·奧比昂·恩圭馬總統(tǒng)的政府是一個瘋狂踐踏人權的政府，他被指責進行政治屠殺、在選舉中舞弊，而且在金融幣制方面也有問題。
[25]赤道幾內(nèi)亞最親密的盟國好像是朝鮮和古巴，國務院有些人開玩笑時曾首當其沖地戲稱該國為最差的海外崗位。1993年，美國大使約翰·貝內(nèi)特因盡力解救當?shù)氐恼畏付盏搅怂劳鐾{。
[26]阿爾溫德·加內(nèi)桑為《人權觀察》工作，一直跟蹤研究這個問題。他說："問題是，'你希望用現(xiàn)代技術訓練出一支可以自我保存下來的軍隊嗎?'"
[27]戴維·伊森伯格是DynMeridian咨詢公司的軍備控制分析家。他說，當遇到官方渠道做工作受到阻礙或政治上有困難等不確定情況時，就常常使用私營軍事公司。"政府喜歡這樣，因為如果(發(fā)生什么問題)，這可以避免引起抗議浪潮。"
[28]但是，他解釋說，美國需要更好地對私營軍事公司進行規(guī)范管理，總的來說，這些公司愿意遵循明確制定的規(guī)章。
[29]“如果政府想充分利用他們，就需要對他們進行規(guī)范管理，”他說。“那會平息……害怕他們會成為惡棍流氓或兵痞的恐懼心理。”
